Since the end of World War II, the liberal international order that  provided the institutional foundation for global trade has been in de cline, and the restructuring of supply chains has emerged as a core is sue in international politics. Following the dysfunction of the rules-based multilateral system of GATT/WTO, the contours of an alter native international trade order remain uncertain. However, expect ations are growing that a new order based on a balance of power among major powers that recognize each other’s spheres of influence  will reemerge.

 Western advanced countries such as the US and Europe are leading these changes at the international order level and are pushing forward trade and industrial policies aimed at fundamentally restructuring sup ply chain structures that have developed in line with the existing order  as core policy agendas. China and Russia are also introducing new supply chain strategies in response to these changes in the international political landscape, and North Korea is expected to pursue policies to secure a new position. The international political environment surrounding North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as China and  Russia’s supply chain strategies, will bring about structural changes  that will significantly influence North Korea’s relations with the global  market and its economic development strategies.

 To understand the significance of the current supply chain restructuring and anticipate future directions, it is necessary to adopt a long-term historical perspective and trace the changes in the nature of  international division of labor among the three countries back to the socialist era before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the participation of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea in international trade, as well as trade among the three countries, was characterized by exclusion from the Western-dominated international order. The COMECON system, which was established as an alternative international order centered on the Soviet Union, also failed to provide a sustainable source of long-term growth through the expansion and deepening of international division of labor among nations. International  division of labor that transcended bilateral cooperation centered on aid did not develop between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviet  Union and North Korea, and the trade order and structure linking the  three countries did not develop.

 The collapse of the Cold War served as an opportunity for former so cialist countries such as Russia and China to participate in the Western-led international trade order. The trade and production struc tures that had been formed in response to exclusion from the  Western-led order underwent fundamental restructuring to align with  new division of labor relationships in the global market. The most sig  nificant structural change is the rise of China as an industrial powerhouse. China has rapidly emerged as a hub in global supply  chains across many industries. As China’s demand for energy and resources necessary for industrial development surged, a GVC-type trade structure developed, connecting resource-rich countries, China as a manufacturing base, and advanced countries as consumer markets. Trade between China and Russia has also increased rapidly in line with this trend, centered on Chinese manufacturing exports and Russian energy and resource exports. Meanwhile, North Korea has been unable to escape the exclusion it experienced during the Cold War and has not experienced a significant increase in international trade. In particular, the economic sanctions imposed due to the nuclear crisis have further exacerbated the situation.